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Abstrat. Considering topologies of anonymous networks we used to
organizing anonymous ommuniation into hard to trae paths hiding
its origin or destination. In anonymity the ompany is ruial, however
the serial transportation imposes a ostly tradeo between a level of
privay and a speed of ommuniation.
This paper introdues a framework of a novel arhiteture for anonymous
networks that hides initiators of ommuniations by parallelization of
anonymous links. The new approah, whih is based on the grounds of
the anonymous P2P network alled P2Priv, does not require ontent for-
warding via a hain of proxy nodes to assure high degree of anonymity.
Contrary to P2Priv, the new arhiteture an be suited to anonymiza-
tion of various network ommuniations, inluding anonymous aess
to distributed as well as lient-server servies. In partiular, it an be
onsidered as an anonymization platform for these network appliations
where both privay and low delays are required.
Key words: Communi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urity, privay, anonymity
1 Introdution
Anonymous ommuniations by means of publi paket networks involve two
ontraditory tasks: the rst is transport and routingwhih requires a de-
tail information on origin and destination points of ommuniations, and the
seond is anonymizationwhih is basially aimed at hiding of this informa-
tion and espeially an assoiation between them. Certainly, addressing informa-
tion is essential for a suessful delivery of ontent and therefore it annot be
expunged. Hene in general, the ally of anonymous ommuniation is olletive
[10,7,8℄. The single word rowd speaks volumes about anonymity. The more nu-
merous a set of ators involved in an information exhange blending into a rowd
is easier to ahieve. And then, the higher tra volume among these ators the
faster our tra an be hidden and exhanged. In general, to represent suh a
olletive, an operation of anonymous networks is based on a sequential traf-
 forwarding by a subgroup of network nodes, also known as proxy haining
[13℄. However, substantial delays mount up in this way. This paper introdues
an alternate arhiteture for anonymous networks, a network privay preserv-
ing parallel topology, where network ators organize themselves in parallel links.
The topology of the new solution evolves from the anonymous P2P network
alled P2Priv [16℄. However, the appliations of the new arhiteture are not
limited to P2P ontent distribution and its deployment an be onsidered for
generi-purpose anonymous networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 provides an introdu-
tion to topology issues of anonymous networks. Setion 3 desribes a model of
an adversary while Setion 4 ontains an anonymity analysis of parallel arhite-
ture of P2Priv applied rst, in aordane with its intended use, for P2P ontent
distribution, and seondly, for lient-server like senarios. Setion 5 ontains a
desription of our novel solution able to assure anonymity for entralized net-
work servies, while its anonymity analysis is presented in Setion 6. Conlusions
and disussion of a future work are inluded in Setion 7.
2 Bakground
The topology of anonymous networks has been widely disussed sine the in-
trodution of Chaum's Mix-net anonymous network [4℄ and among a variety of
anonymous networks, the most attention has been devoted to the interonne-
tion issues of Mix-based nodes. Originally, the route through a asade of Mixes
was xed. Further improvements allowed a sender to randomly selet a path for
eah message in the so alled free-route topologies [1,12℄. Hybrid models with
a restrited number of onnetions and path seletion narrowed to restrited-
routes were proposed in [6℄. Both xed asades and fully interonneted Mix
networks with random routes have assorted onstraints and the advantage of
eah depends primarily on the area of their deployment and the sale of the net-
work [1,2,5,14℄. Today's Mixes allow to route ontent in various ways determined
by sender nodes.
Besides Mixes, other designs of anonymous networks were proposed within
individual interonnetion strategies. Anonymous message-by-message routing
alled onion routing was proposed by Goldshlag et al. [13℄. Today, several im-
plementations of this onept are available, inluding the low-lateny network
alled the seond generation onion router (TOR) designed by Dingledine et al.
[11℄the general purpose anonymous network of the world-wide range.
Reiter et al. proposed other low-lateny anonymous network alled Crowds
with anonymous routing based on the rando-walk step [18℄. In this strategy
senders do not inuene a path seletion whih is determined in a random man-
ner in eah hop sequentially. Both hop-by-hop and message-by-message routing
strategies are less robust against tra dropping by proxy nodes than Mix-
network. Still, their simpliity makes them attrative in pratie [3℄.
By and large, the ommon feature of anonymous networks is their serial ar-
hiteture and a formation of untraeable paths via middle-man nodes for anony-
mous ontent forwarding. Due to suh praxis, and in ombination with tra
enryption and anonymization tehniques deployed inside proxy nodes (e.g., on-
tent bathing, aggregations, and permutations), an observer of the anonymous
networks annot pratially point out senders and reeivers in a bath of inter-
mixed ontent ows via middle-man nodes.
2.1 Parallel Arhiteture of P2Priv
The serial ontent forwarding, known from today's anonymous networks, was
omitted in the arhiteture of the anonymous peer-to-peer overlay network alled
P2Priv (peer-to-peer diret and anonymous distribution overlay) proposed by
Margasi«ski et al. in [16℄. The topology of the P2Priv network, in respet to
ontent transportation, involves a number of additional virtual links similar to
lassial anonymous networks; however it is arranged in a parallel manner.
Figure 1 illustrates the parallel arhiteture of P2Priv with solid lines repre-
senting plain-text ommuniation and dotted lines orresponding to ommuni-
ation seured by the anonymization tehniques. Let us have a loser look at the
P2Priv arhiteture. Before a ontent transportation, a signalization token with
meta-data desribing the ontent is forwarded over lassial anonymous paths
towards formation of so alled loning asades (CC). The well-known anony-
mous tehniques (i.e., Mix network and random walk algorithm) are utilized in
the anonymization proess of this lightweight ommuniation (tra omprised
by numerous and short messages sent by random nodes is in favour of a Mix-net
performane) and hiding the initiator of the CC. Then, after a random interval
of time, eah CC member (i.e., group of the so alled lones and the true initia-
tor) ommuniates diretly and independently with a destination node or nodes
towards ontent transportation. The anonymity of P2Priv is based on a olle-
tive formed in a parallelism-based manner, as every ontent exhange in P2Priv
is aompanied by a simultaneously generated exhange of the same ontent
between random nodes. The proess of nding the true initiator among P2Priv
nodes is hard to perform even for an adversary able to ollude a signiant range
of nodes.
Fig. 1: P2Priv arhiteture (left) as ompared to lassial anonymous network
(right).
Results of anonymity and tra performane analysis are promising for
P2Priv [16,17℄. However, they have been obtained for a distributed environment
whih is not always available in general-purpose ommuniations.
3 Threat Model
We onsider a threat model with a partial adversary who ontrols a olluding
fration ρ of all overlay network nodes N . These maliious nodes are able to
provide both passive and ative attaks. We onsider a stati adversary unable
to arbitrarily adapt the set of maliious nodes among user nodes and we assume
that olluding nodes are uniformly distributed among equivalent nodes. How-
ever, whenever we will deal with server-like nodes or just entralized points of
ommuniation, we will treat these nodes as easy to hoose points of observation
and assume that these nodes an be ompromised. Using information entropy
measures and based on the information theoreti anonymity measurement model
[9,19℄, an adversary who posses no information about the system an desribe
his/her unertainty in suessful nding of the initiator of a partiular ation
(let as all her Alie) as
Hmax = −
|N |(1−Cs)∑
i=1
1
|N | (1− ρ)
log2(
1
|N | (1− ρ)
). (1)
= − log2(|N | (1− ρ)).
4 Anonymity Analysis for P2Priv
As the new arhiteture proposed in this paper share some primitives with
P2Priv, we will apply the threat model to P2Priv arhiteture rst and dis-
uss its anonymity in two servie senarios. In the rst one, likely to our in
fully distributed P2P systems, we will onsider ontent distribution (e.g., P2P
le-sharing) among equivalent peers. Seondly, we will analyze anonymity oered
by P2Priv for typial lient-server network servies where lient nodes onnet
repeatedly to some server (e.g., a popular Web server). Notie that models,
similar to the rst senario, has been investigated previously in [16,15,17℄ with
dierent adversary possibilities onsidered. The seond senario has not been
onsidered yet. For simpliity purposes, the senarios will be referred to as P2P
Senario and Client-Server Senario respetively.
The detailed desription of P2Priv was introdued in[17℄. At a glane, loning
asade (CC) of P2Priv is established in random-walk manner with a mean
length desribed by probability pf , as follows [17℄
|CC| =
pf − 2
pf − 1
. (2)
Eah step of the token's random-walk is sent by a Mix-network layer formed
for this purpose by user nodes (N). After establishing CC, randomly delayed
diret onnetions originate from CC nodes towards ontent transportation (Fig-
ure 1). The analysis of various attaks on P2Priv (presented in [15℄) shows that
a seure onguration of P2Priv starts from pf = 2/3 whih orresponds to CC
mean length equal 4.
4.1 P2Priv in P2P Senario
The adversary tries to nd out who initiates a ontent distribution in respet
to some ontent of his interest. A linkage between the loning token's sender
Alie and the loning token is hidden by means of the Mix-net layer. Mix-net is
reognized as one of the strongest anonymization methods. However, it requires
adequate user tra harateristis to ahieve its best results. In partiular,
tra volume is ruial for its eieny. Daz et al. in [8℄ prove that pratial
Mix designs ahieve results lose to perfet indistinguishability for high tra
arrivals. For eah P2Priv transation, the P2Priv protool generates short but
numerous messages sent by random nodes. This an allow Mix-net to assure
high anonymity without unneessary delays. The anonymity analysis of Mix-net
is independent of the urrent exposition and in our model we assume perfet
performane of Mix-net layer. We assume that the adversary does not get any
information about Alie during the establishment of CC. However, the adversary
having the fration ρ of maliious nodes an gain awareness that a partiular
ontent is about to be distributed. If the loning token desribing this ontent is
passed via one of the maliious nodes, the adversary an disturb CC establishing
in a way that allows him to get more information in a subsequent phrase of
ontent transportation. The adversary, who looks for the initiator of partiular
ontent's distribution, an try to narrow the irle of suspets. While possessing
fration ρ of olluding nodes among N , he/she an break the loning asade
using the rst maliious node whih interepts the loning token. The probability
that the adversary manages to break CC immediately after sending out the
token by Alie equals Pr(|CCbreak| = 1) = ρ (we assume that olluding nodes
are uniformly distributed among N). The length of random-walk is one more
hop longer with probability Pr(|CCbreak| = 2) = (1− ρ)(pf ρ+ (1 − pf)). Then
Pr(|CCbreak| = n) = (1− ρ)
n−1(pn−1f ρ+ (1− pf )p
n−2
f ). (3)
As a result of this ation the adversary onludes that the set of parallel
onnetions assoiated with the interesting ontent exhange will ontain an
average of |CCbreak| links, where
|CCbreak| = ρ+
|CC|∑
i=2
i(1− ρ)i−1(pi−1f ρ+ (1− pf )p
i−2
f ) =
[ (1 + |CC|)pf
|CC|(ρ− 1)|CC| −
|CC| pf
|CC|+1(ρ− 1)|CC|+1 −
pf (ρ− 2) + pf
2(ρ− 1) ]
pf (1 + pf (ρ− 1))
−1, |CCbreak| ≤ |N |(1-ρ). (4)
After establishing of CC, P2Priv protool starts diret, plain-text onne-
tions from CC members to destination nodes with shared ontent, eah inde-
pendently delayed with a random interval of time. In the analyzed P2P Senario
the ontent is shared between equivalent peers N . Then, having in mind the
onsidered threat model, we assume that maliious nodes are also uniformly dis-
tributed among destination nodes. The adversary managed to redue the loning
asade from mean length equal |CC| to |CCbreak| (4). Next, he/she will eaves-
drop on eah ontent onnetion established to ρ |N | olluded nodes in order
to detet transmission of the ontent of his/her interest and in onsequene in
searh of onneted CCbreak members. It immediately follows that the adversary
is able to identify CCeavesdrop peers onneted towards the partiular ontent
transportation, an average of
|CCeavesdrop| = ρ |CCbreak| . (5)
Until he/she an be ertain that CCeavesdrop inludes all of the CC or
CCbreak members, he/she annot be determine that CCeavesdrop set inludes
Alie. Let us estimate the unertainty of the adversary in linking of the found
traes to the real initiator. Eah CCeavesdropk , k = {1, . . . , |CCeavesdrop|} node
an be Alie, with equal probability
pa1 = Pr(CCeavesdropk = Alice) = |CCbreak|
−1
. (6)
Alie also an be outside eavesdropped nodes and an be eah other honest
node of the network in the number of |N | − ρ |N | − |CCeavesdrop|. The attak
onduted by the adversary allows him/her to assign probability that one of this
nodes is Alie, to eah equal
pa2 =
1− pa1
|N | − ρ |N | − |CCeavesdrop|
. (7)
Then, we an stress the entropy of P2Priv in P2P Senario as the following
sum of two omponents orresponding to the set of nodes managed to have been
eavesdropped by the adversary and the rest of nodes, respetively
Hp2priv/p2p = −
|CCeavesdrop|∑
k=1
pa1 log2(pa1)
−
|N |−ρ |N |−|CCeavesdrop|∑
l=1
pa2 log2(pa2). (8)
Finally, after substitution and simpliation we will then get
Hp2priv/p2p =
|CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak|
log2(|CCbreak|)−
1− |CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak|
log2(
1− |CCbreak|
|N | − ρ |N | − |CCeavesdrop|
). (9)
Figure 2 shows entropy of P2Priv arhiteture as applied to distributed P2P
le-sharing servie. The entropy of small network (|N | = 10) is plotted in the
full spetrum of olluding nodes. The presented results were obtained for P2Priv
in the following ongurations pf = {1/2, 2/3, 4/5, 6/7}, whih orresponds to
mean loning asade lengths equal: 2, 4, 6, and 8, respetively. We an observe
that, even with a low number of users, P2Priv ahieves results lose to the
maximum in this distributed servie senario and it is robust against a high
fration of ompromised nodes.
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Fig. 2: Entropy for P2Priv in P2P Senario as ompared with maximum entropy,
|N | = 10.
Figure 3 investigates the robustness of P2Priv in a large sale network om-
prised by |N | = 103 nodes. We observe high entropy for a low-to-medium fration
of ompromised nodes.
4.2 P2Priv in Client-Server Senario
Let us apply the P2Priv arhiteture to the opposite, entralized servie senario.
In this ase, all user nodes N onnet to a single server to reeive a partiular
ontent, whih is an item of interest of the adversary. We take into aount that
this server is an easy target for observation and then assume that all its up-link
and down-link tra is being eavesdroped on by the adversary.
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Fig. 3: Entropy for P2Priv in P2P Senario as ompared with maximum entropy,
|N | = 103.
Single Request to Server. Similarly to previously analyzed attak senario, we
assume an ative adversary who is able to break loning asade CC using
fration ρ of maliious nodes sattered in N . Summing it up, we an stress that
in this ase, after an initiation of a ontent onnetion to the server by Alie,
all assoiated onnetions will be established with the server and eavesdropped
on by the adversary. Then, the number of all suspeted nodes an be limited
by the adversary to |CCbreak| (4). The adversary knows that one of these nodes
belongs to Alie, eah of them with the probablity pa1 = |CCbreak|
−1
(6). Then,
entropy of P2Priv in Client-Server Senarios is desribed as follows
Hp2priv/cs = −
|CCbreak|∑
k=1
pa1 log2(pa1) =
log2(|CCbreak|). (10)
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show entropy of P2Priv arhiteture applied for Client-
Server servies. To allow an easier omparison between results obtained for small
and large sale networks, the range of entropy plotted in Figure 5 is the same
as in Figure 4. Then, it does not inlude plot for maximum entropy Hmax whih
ertainly is the same as presented in Figure 3. As we expeted, the results ob-
tained in Client-Server Senario are muh worse than those obtained in P2P
environment for whih P2Priv was intended. Entropy of P2Priv arhiteture in
entralized network is independent of the network sale for a low-to-medium
ompromised network and value about 1.5 bits for 10%-20% frations of mali-
ious nodes.
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Fig. 4: Entropy for P2Priv in Client-Server Senario as ompared with maximum
entropy, |N | = 10.
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Fig. 5: Entropy for P2Priv in Client-Server Senario, |N | = 103.
Long-Term Observation. The previous analysis shows entropy of P2Priv in
entralized servie senario and the evaluated information leaks orrespond to
a single onnetion to the server. However, onsidering lient-server servies,
sequential requests to a partiular server are ommon. It should be notied, that
P2Priv does not assure long-term availability of individual nodes, so the CC is
deemed to hange over time (with the exeption of the true sender). P2Priv was
not designed for servies haraterized by a sequential ommuniation to a single
network node and it annot be applied for these purposes in its urrent form.
4.3 Summary of the Results
We have found that the parallel transport arhiteture of P2Priv does not as-
sure a satisfatory anonymity level for entralized servies. Still the onept of
transport parallelization and the moving of time-onsuming anonymization teh-
niques to signalization layer seem to be very attrative in the terms of anonymous
tra lateny. In the rest of this paper we will disuss the possibilities of using
the parallelism-based approah to network anonymization not limited to P2P
ontent distribution.
5 Network Privay Preserving Parallel Topology
Considering general purpose anonymous networks, we an distinguish four basi
types of network nodes : (i) lient/user nodes, (ii) middle-man nodes or proxy
servers, (iii) the so alled exit nodes, and (iv) servie nodes/servers. Client nodes
send requests through middle-man nodes to gain an anonymous aess to ser-
vies provided by servie nodes (iv). On the other hand, exit nodes (iii) are
middle-man nodes whih are permitted by their poliy to be boundary nodes
of forwarding asadesthese nodes onnet diretly to servie nodes (iv) on
behalf of users (i). In various networks these sets are merged in dierent ombi-
nations. In partiular, all nodes of pure P2P networks an at as lient nodes (i),
middle-man nodes (ii), exit nodes (iii), and server nodes (iv) as neessary. Suh
division of roles orresponds to P2Priv. However, when it omes to a generi
tra anonymization, we should separate user nodes from exit nodes as not ev-
ery user wishes to ommit to sharing his/her node as an exit node. Certainly,
having in mind lient-server network appliations, we should also distinguish
servie nodes (iv).
To provide general-purpose sender anonymization we propose an anonymous
network arhiteture whih joins P2Priv parallel transportation of ontent (ol-
letive is omprised by parallel links, similary to P2Priv) with proxy funtions
(eah link is terminated by exit node). The new arhiteture is derived from
P2Priv P2P network and is dediated to general-puprose anonymous networks,
though it will be referred to as NetPriv (network privay preserving parallel
topology).
Let us group nodes in the anonymous network as follows: N is the set of user
nodes, potential initiators of ommuniation and E represents exit-nodes. We
joined (i) and (ii) in our network model as the anonymity of the proposed solution
is basially based on the diulty of dierentiation between real senders and
other nodes whih simultaneously at the same way the senders at. NetPriv is
a hybrid solution whih largely reets P2Priv topology of parallel links between
N nodes. However, eah of these links is additionally terminated by a link to a
mixing exit node (E). Figure 6 illustrates the model of the proposed network.
In addition, it ompares it to lassial anonymous networks.
To allow an anonymous ommuniation in the desribed arhiteture we pro-
pose the following sub-solutions: (i) persistent CC path seletion by sender, (ii)
time synhronization of requests sending by CC members.
Persistent CC Path Seletion. The disussion inluded in Setion 4.2 shows that
the parallel arhiteture of P2Priv, onsidered in the sope of servies hara-
terized by series of user requests to the same destination node or server, is not
robust against long-term observations. The reason is that path seletion based
on a random-walk does not ensure persistent CC paths, so the CC is deemed to
hange over time (with the exeption of the true sender). The anonymity of CC
ommuniations was from the beginning assured by the Mix-net layer. Having
this in mind, we propose a replaement of random-walk-based path seletion
for CC with free-route routing dediated for Mix-network [1,12℄. In this way a
sender selets one CC for a whole session of an anonymous ommuniation.
Requests Time Synhronization. The seond issue the requires revision is answer-
ing the question how exatly CC members randomly delay their onnetions to
destination node/nodes. To assure that the adversary an not distinguish Alie
from other CC members by an analysis of onnetion times of individual lones
(lone that most frequently onnets rst an be distinguish as the initiator), we
propose inlusion of time eld in loning token whih speify starting time for
onnetions and allows synhronization of onnetion times. The time interval,
indiated by Alie, should be longer than time required to send token via CC.
Then, eah CC member adds additinal randomly generated delay to time indi-
ated in reeived token and on time aluated in suh a way he sends request
to an exit node. Aordingly, loning token will onsist of the following elds:
{dest_addr, reqest_time, request}
and the request originated to a mixing exit node onsists of:
{src_addr, dest_addr, request}PKe .
An exit node sends request to a destination node or nodes, based on informa-
tion inluded in the reeived request. Certainly, a soure address in his request
pointes at him.
6 Anonymity Analysis for NetPriv
Let us analyze anonymity of the new arhiteture. Previously, we have shown
that the parallel transport arhiteture assures high entropy for distributed ser-
Fig. 6: NetPriv arhiteture (left) as ompared to general-purpose lassial
anonymous network (right).
vies of le-sharing (8) without improvements proposed in NetPriv. The vital
question is how the new arhiteture of NetPriv deals with Client-Server Servie
Senarios (ompare to Setion 4.2). As the exit nodes and the user nodes have
been disjointed, NetPriv anonymity model an allow an analysis of a dierent
fration of ompromised nodes in eah of these sets. One an imagine that dier-
ent servie senarios provoke and permit for dierent ollaboration possibilities,
espeially as it omes to the set of exit nodes whih an be, e.g., dediated servers
of a partiular anonymous servie, publi proxies, or nodes voluntarily provided
by network users. As previously assumed ρ represents fration of mailious user
nodes. Let ρe represent fration of maliious nodes among exit nodes. Then
|CCeavesdrop| = ρe |CCbreak| . (11)
Similarly to the previous model, the adversary an assign probability pa1to
eah node of this set (6). Alie an aslo be outside of eavesdropped nodes. We
assume that destination nodes/servers are ompromised and ρe of exit nodes is
ompromised. Then eah honest node of N nodes an be Alie with probability
pa3 = (1−
|CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak|
)
1
N − ρN − |CCeavesdrop|
. (12)
Finally, the anonymity of the NetPriv arhiteture in the Client-Server se-
nario is desribed by entropy
HNetPriv = − |CCeavesdrop| pa1 log2(pa1)−
(N − ρN − |CCeavesdrop|)pa3 log2(pa3), (13)
HNetPriv =
|CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak|
log2(|CCbreak|)−
(1−
|CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak|
) log2(
|CCbreak| − |CCeavesdrop|
|CCbreak| (N − ρN − |CCeavesdrop|)
).(14)
Figure 7 shows entropy of NetPriv in the full spetrum of ompromised user
nodes (ρ) and ompromised exit nodes (ρe) for lient-server servies.
(a) |N | = 10 (b) |N | = 103
Fig. 7: Entropy for NetPriv arhiteture, |CC| = 4.
We an observe that the new arhiteture assures high entropy both for
small as well as large sale networks. Exit nodes an be partiularly vulnerable
to being ompromised. Figures 8, 9 show entropy for NetPriv for onstant value
of ρe = 1/2. The results show that even for this high fration of ollaborating
exit nodes NetPriv assure high level of anonymity.
7 Conlusions and Future Work
Today's topologies of anonymous networks shape anonymous ommuniations
into hard to trae paths hiding their origin or destination. Transportation of
anonymous ontent via pervasive paths omposed of several hops is in favour
of anonymity. Still, it imposes a signiant tra bottlenek. The phenomenon
of the Internet virtualization and pratial possibilities that allow us today to
deploy heterogeneous overlay networks of the world-wide range enourage on-
sideration of new network topologies adapted to spei network servies. In
this paper we have proposed a framework of a novel arhiteture for anonymous
networksthe network privay preserving parallel topology (NetPriv). NetPriv
hides initiators of ommuniations by parallelization of anonymous links. The
new approah is based on the premise of the anonymous P2P network alled
P2Priv [16℄. Contrary to P2Priv, the new arhiteture an be suited to the
anonymization of general-purpose network ommuniations. The new solution
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Fig. 8: Entropy for NetPriv in Client-Server Senario as ompared with maximum
entropy, |N | = 10.
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entropy, |N | = 103.
moves time-onsuming anonymization tehniques into a signalization layer and
ombines the primary transport parallelization priniple of P2Priv with proxy
funtions. Additionally, a persistent seletion of signalization paths and requests
time synhronization mehanisms have been proposed. We applied an informa-
tion theoreti entropy measurement model to evaluate anonymity of both arhi-
tetures. We analyzed anonymity of the previous (P2Priv) and the new (NetPriv)
arhitetures with a partiular emphasis on entralized, lient-server servie se-
narios. We have found that P2Priv an assure high degree of anonymity in the
limited sope of network servies. P2Priv is dediated to a large size ontent
distribution and requires a distributed servie overlay network to assure high
degree of anonymity. Additionally, we have found that anonymity of P2Priv de-
reases when destination points of ommuniation are not distributed. Contrary
to the previous solution, we have found that the new arhiteture an be applied
to the anonymization of various network ommuniations, inluding lient-server
servies (e.g., anonymous Web aess). For a realisti sope of ompromised net-
work nodes, NetPriv anonymity is lose to maximum. From the user's point of
view, the new solution oers a high level of anonymity within only a single proxy
node.
The new parallelism-based approah presented in this paper gives the frame-
work for parallel anonymous topologies. However, it should be notied that this
disussion enourages further work. The rst vital issue, that needs to be ad-
dressed, is the design of follow-up extensions allowing for a bi-diretional anony-
mous ommuniation whih inludes a reeiver anonymity. Seondly, an inter-
esting area of NetPriv analysis is its tra performane evaluation. Certainly,
NetPriv, whih allows anonymous transportation via a single proxy, an be on-
sidered as the solution able to signiantly improve the speed of an anony-
mous ommuniation (the tra analysis of P2Priv demonstrates substantial
dereases of the ontent transportation time as ompared with traditional net-
works [16,17,15℄). However, a detailed and pratial analysis an be helpful in
determination of proper NetPriv ongurations and its exat impat on network
tra.
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